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During my education at MIT and Stanford in the 70’s, the methodological principles I learned 
were based on logical positivism. Methodological training in graduate programs in economics 
has not changed much since then. This is surprising, since logical positivism collapsed as a 
philosophy  of  science  in  the  1950’s.  Unfortunately,  the  foundations  of  economics  and 
econometrics  continue  to  rely  on  this  obsolete  philosophy.    The  hard  work  and  thought 
required to build a sound methodology going beyond positivism, has not been done. Radical 
changes  in  both  economics  and  econometrics  would  result  from  the  complete  overhaul 
required to  do this  job.  We must remember that econometrics is  a  young discipline, and 
Kuhn’s work shows that scientific progress depends on revolutions. I will point out some 
directions which I think are important, and encourage researchers to work on these areas. 
Some more ideas are given in my paper on causality, coming in the next volume. 
 
One of the key ideas of logical positivism is that all real knowledge comes from facts and 
logic. The subjective ingredients of opinions, value judgments, intuitions, etc. play no role in 
scientific knowledge. In econometrics, this suggests that the data, plus correct theory, will 
determine the truth. I was taught to believe that we can find out which of several competing 
theories are true by the use of econometric methods. When I tried to do this – for example, to 
find out which theory of consumption function is right – I found that it does not work like 
this. Data CAN rule out certain theories, but is unable to decide among several others.  
 
This fundamental problem – call it “under-determination” – has been rediscovered in many 
different areas of scientific inquiry. Even when we have all possible facts at our disposal, 
there will always be a large number of theories which are compatible with the facts: theories 
are not completely determined by observations. This is almost immediately obvious in the 
econometrics context, since we can fit any number of models to a finite collection of data.  
Thus choice of a model is ALWAYS based on facts + some subjective elements.  A positivist 
mindset has led us to ignore the subjective elements of model choice, which are crucial to the 
selection of the final model. Systematic approaches to this subjective ingredient are available 
in  Bayesian  econometrics,  and  also  in  Hendry’s  methodology,  but  neither  of  these  is 
sufficient. There are many, many arbitrary ingredients in model choice which are not subject 
to analysis. 
 
Contrary to positivist ideas, choosing among models inevitably involves a subjective element. 
Because this is not widely recognized, the final model selected depends on many arbitrary 
choices made by the econometrician. This leads to an extremely diverse set of models, and 
conflicting conclusions about any possible issue which has been the subject of an econometric 
study.  The  only  way  to  remedy  this  is  to  take  this  subjective  element  in  model  choice 
explicitly into account. Subject matter knowledge provides valid additional input into this 
model choice, and must be taken into account in any serious econometric investigation. This 
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means  that  econometrician  must  learn  about  the  real  world  issues  which  are  under 
investigation via the regression models he/she is estimating. This real world knowledge is an 
essential guide to choosing among competing models, which cannot be done purely on the 
basis of data. 
 
This recommendation for the econometrician to learn about and utilize real world knowledge 
in model selection is contrary to the idea of “specialization” which suggests that we should 
confine ourselves to the statistical analysis. My personal experience, and also that of several 
others (including Freedman, see vol 1 of this journal) who have ventured in this direction, is 
that this is extremely fruitful and enlightening. Thus I strongly encourage all researchers to 
transgress discipline boundaries and go beyond the purely statistical analysis to a serious 
investigation of the real world issues which regression models purport to address.  
 